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Abstract	




debates	 in	 the	 country:	 ‘energy	 for	 development’	 that	 privileges	 energy	 as	 critical	 to	
economic	growth	and	 long	 term	strategic	 security;	 and	 ‘energy	 for	all’	 that	prioritises	 the	




highlight	 the	 societal	 choices	 that	 are	 inherent	 in	 discussions	 about	 transformations	 in	





India	 has	 pledged	 ambitious	 goals	 to	 increase	 its	 clean	 energy	 capacity	 in	 its	 submitted	
Nationally	Determined	Contribution	 (NDC)	 to	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 on	 climate	 change	 [1].	
This	 includes	 a	 commitment	 to	 install	 low	 carbon	 energy	 capacity	 up	 to	 40%	of	 the	 total	
installed	electrical	 capacity	by	2030	and	 to	 reduce	 the	carbon	 intensity	of	 its	economy	by	
33-35	%	by	2030.	The	government	has	also	publically	declared	a	domestic	target	for	175	GW
of	renewable	energy	(RE)	capacity	in	the	country	by	20221,	including	100	GW	of	solar	and	60
GW	of	wind	 energy	 capacity.	 In	 2027,	 India	 is	 estimated	 to	 have	 installed	 275	GW	of	 RE
capacity	which	would	be	more	than	a	four-fold	increase	on	current	levels	[2].	At	the	same
time,	 the	 Indian	 government	 has	 committed	 to	 bold	 plans	 to	 achieve	 universal	 access	 to
electricity	in	the	country	by	December	2018	[3].
Several	 studies	 and	 reports	 have	 been	 commissioned	 to	 study	 the	 pathways	 for	 India’s	
energy	future	and	how	it	may	transition	to	a	clean	energy	supply	from	one	that	is	currently	
dominated	 by	 fossil	 fuels,	 especially	 coal,	 which	 in	 2015	 supplied	 nearly	 80%	 of	 India’s	
electricity	(see	in	Figure	1).	However,	transformations	in	the	Indian	electricity	sector	will	be	
a	complex	process	and	as	we	show	in	this	paper,	there	is	a	lack	of	social	consensus	on	what	
the	 preferred	 policy	 pathway	 for	 this	 transition	 should	 be.	 Trade-offs	 between	 energy	
access	 and	 environmental	 constraints	 as	 well	 as	 contestation	 over	 the	 pathways	 for	
deployment	 of	 certain	 technologies	 lead	 to	 contrasting	 visions	 of	 energy	 futures.	
Accordingly,	 the	 policy	 roadmaps	 required	 to	 implement	 India’s	 ambitious	 electrification	
and	 clean	 energy	 goals	 diverge.	 Key	 actors	 in	 the	 energy	 domain	 such	 as	 policymakers,	
power	producers,	and	civil	society	actors	coalesce	around	different	narratives	of	the	role	of	
energy	 in	 society	 and	 the	 goals	 and	 priorities	 of	 Indian	 energy	 policy.	 By	 sketching	 out	
central	fault	lines	as	well	as	interesting	overlaps	we	aim	at	making	a	point	for	strengthening	
the	analysis	of	socio-cultural	dimensions	in	developing	future	pathways	for	energy	systems	
in	 India,	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	 other	 developing	 countries.	 Bringing	 these	






are	 points	 of	 interventions	 where	 narratives	 may	 'speak'	 to	 each	 other	 in	 order	 to	 find	
compromises?	Through	our	brief	empirical	 analysis,	we	outline	 the	broad	contours	of	 the	
two	 overarching	 narratives	 that	 are	 currently	 jostling	 for	 pre-eminence	 in	 debates	 over	
India’s	energy	future.	We	believe	this	holds	value	 in	two	ways:	1-	 it	can	serve	to	 initiate	a	
much	needed	discussion	and	research	agenda	on	the	importance	of	social	debate	and	value	








futures.	 Section	 3	 describes	 the	 concept	 of	 narratives	 used	 in	 this	 study,	 and	 the	
methodology	 used	 to	 deconstruct	 the	 different	 policy	 narratives.	 Section	 4	 outlines	 the	
competing	 policy	 narratives	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 bringing	 these	 futures	
about.	 Section	 5	 discusses	 some	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 alternative	 narratives	 for	
debates	 on	 energy	 futures	 in	 India,	 suggesting	 that	 these	 debates	must	 engage	with	 the	




The	 domestic	 targets	 for	 RE	 growth,	 India’s	 NDC	 commitments	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	
Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	 (UNFCCC),	and	the	rapidly	 falling	price	of	solar	
and	wind	 power	 in	 India	 are	 leading	 to	 discourse	 around	 far	 reaching	 changes	 in	 India’s	
electricity	 sector.	 However,	 complex	 systems	 such	 as	 the	 electricity	 grid	 in	 a	 country	 like	
India,	 rarely	 (if	 ever)	 lend	 themselves	 to	 such	 uncomplicated	 claims	 of	 linear	 transitions	
without	 inviting	 significant	 challenges	 and	 counter	 claims.	 In	 fact,	 a	 review	 of	 seven	
independent	modelling	studies	found	a	broad	range	of	possible	outcomes,	ranging	from	7%	
to	31%	of	clean	electricity	 in	2030	[5].	As	the	authors	of	 the	review	note,	 ‘..projections	of	
India’s	 future	electricity	mix	 suggest	widely	divergent	projections	on	 the	 future	electricity	
mix	 in	2030	even	 in	reference	scenarios.’	Even	under	reference	scenarios,	growth	rates	of	
RE	for	instance	vary	by	as	much	as	a	factor	of	four.	Interestingly,	even	the	most	ambitious	
growth	 rates	 are	 more	 modest	 than	 the	 government	 targets	 [5].	 The	 authors	 go	 on	 to	
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However,	 scholars	 have	 noted	 the	 narrow	 scope	 of	 mainstream	 energy	 debates	 which	
consider	 lack	 of	 consensus	 as	 a	 function	 of	 techno-economic	 inadequacies	 which	 can	 be	
improved	upon	[6].	It	has	been	observed	that	‘conflicts	in	the	domain	of	energy	and	climate	
are	not	primarily	due	to	lack	of	scientific	facts	or	objective	truth.	Instead,	they	are	more	due	
to	 a	 clash	 of	 priorities,	 interests,	 and	 normative	 assumptions	 which	 create	 a	 number	 of	
subjective	truths’	[7].	Resolution	on	‘facts’	are	implausible	when	the	disagreements	are	at	a	
‘framework’	 level	 -	 divergences	 in	 energy	 futures	 are	 not	 so	 much	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	
differing	data	sets	and	modelling	methods	used	but	rather	symptomatic	of	 the	competing	
logic	 driving	 such	 studies.	 Competing	 visions	 of	 societal	 futures	 drive	 the	 construction	 of	
alternate	energy	policy	pathways	[8]	but	mainstream	literature	on	energy	studies	pays	little	
attention	to	visions	as	key	drivers	of	energy	policy	debate	[9,10].		
More	 broadly,	 the	 use	 of	 techno-economic	 modelling	 processes	 itself	 suffers	 from	





Alternative	 policy	 pathways	 for	 energy	 transformations	 reflect	 not	 just	 different	
technological	 choices	 and	 economic	 assumptions	 but	 in	 many	 cases	 represent	
fundamentally	different	governance	frameworks	[8,13].	Policy	systems,	regulatory	contexts,	
role	 of	 institutions,	 user	 practices	 and	 consumer-producer	 relationships	 can	 significantly	
vary	 between	 alternative	 pathways	 as	 technological	 change	 precipitates	 a	 range	 of	 social	
outcomes.	 Lovins	 has	 argued	 that	 ‘hard’	 and	 ‘soft’	 energy	 paths	 which	 emphasise	
centralised	vs	decentralised	solutions	respectively	are	distinguished	not	only	by	‘choices	of	
hardware’	 but	 ‘by	 the	 socio-political	 structure	 of	 the	 system’	 [14].	 They	 are	 therefore	
‘mutually	 exclusive’,	 not	 as	 a	 result	 of	 technical	 incompatibility	 but	 due	 to	 the	 divergent	
governance	 arrangements	 they	 require	 [14].	 A	 recent	 study	 of	 controversy	 among	 future	
visions	of	RE	 in	Europe	also	 finds	 that	 the	roots	of	 the	contestation	 lie	 in	 ‘normative	end-
state	 aims	 and	 governance	 solutions	 for	 achieving	 these	 aims,	 and	 not	 primarily	 in	
technology,	power	mix	pie-charts	or	costs’	[15].	
Methods	such	as	social-technical	scenarios,	narratives,	and	storylines	are	increasingly	being	
used	 to	 address	 this	 lacuna	 in	 energy	 policy	 debates	 and	 capture	 the	 interconnections	
between	social	and	technical	pathways	of	change	and	their	co-evolution	[16,17].	This	paper	





A	 narrative	 is	 a	 story	 with	 a	 temporal	 sequence	 of	 events	 which	 lays	 out	 a	 problem,	 its	
causes	 and	 consequences	 and	 typically	 makes	 arguments	 for	 possible	 solutions	 to	 the	
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problem	[18–20].	Narratives	simplify	and	communicate	complex	issues	and	enable	actors	to	
make	 decisions	 in	 the	 face	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 complexity	 [18].	 They	 may	 help	 frame	 a	
system	 and	 the	 guidelines	 for	 action	 for	 different	 actors	 in	 the	 system	 [21].	 Narratives	
normally	characterise	actors	in	the	story	as	heroes,	villains	and	victims.	Attributing	roles	for	
actors	 in	 a	 story	 is	 a	 useful	 way	 to	 inspire	 action	 and	 affix	 blame	 and	 responsibility	
[18,22,23].	The	importance	of	analysing	narratives	in	policy	debate	relies	on	the	assumption	
that	 subjective	 reality	 and	 facts	 are	 social	 constructions,	 and	 narratives	 influence	 how	
individuals	interpret	the	world	around	them	[24,25].		
Narratives	have	a	clear	purpose	for	policy	change	as	they	are	not	simply	neutral,	objective	
descriptions	 of	 the	 status	 quo	 but	 provide	 suggestions	 on	 how	 the	 world	 should	 be,	 by	
identifying	both	the	norm	and	the	point	of	departure	[25].	Narratives	may	therefore	often	
be	 strategically	 designed	 to	 influence	 the	 policy	 preferences	 of	 the	 target	 audience	 and	
narratives	usually	express	a	 stance	on	policy	 issues	 [22,26].	Narratives	 therefore	 interplay	
with	 frames	 in	 that	 they	 start	 with	 a	 particular	 framing	 of	 an	 issue	 and	 seek	 to	 suggest	
solutions	on	that	basis.		
“Narratives	 are	 created	 and	 promoted	 by	 particular	 actors,	 networks	 and	
institutions.	They	often	start	with	a	particular	framing	of	a	system	and	its	dynamics,	
and	 suggest	 particular	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 should	 develop	 or	 transform	 to	 bring	
about	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 outcomes.	 Narratives	 therefore	 suggest	 and	 justify	
particular	kinds	of	action,	strategy	and	intervention.	Some	narratives,	in	turn,	come	
to	 be	 supported	 by	 institutional	 and	 political	 processes	 –	 governance	 –	 so	 as	 to	
define	 and	 shape	 pathways:	 particular	 directions	 in	 which	 interacting	 social,	
technological	 and	 environmental	 systems	 co-evolve	 over	 time.	 Other	 narratives,	
meanwhile,	 may	 not	 become	 manifested	 in	 actual	 pathways	 of	 intervention	 and	
change,	remaining	marginalised.”	[27]	
Particular	 framings	 and	 narratives	 of	 an	 issue	 therefore	 ‘lock	 in’	 a	 particular	 set	 of	
processes,	 technologies,	 system	boundaries,	 political	 goals,	 strategies	 of	 intervention	 and	
socio-economic	 arrangements	 that	 marginalise	 alternative	 pathways	 [27].	 Geels	 [28]	 for	















The	 dominant	 narratives	 were	 deconstructed	 through	 qualitative	 analysis	 of	 secondary	
sources	-	technical	and	non	technical	publications	such	as	future	energy	scenarios	studies,	
peer	 reviewed	 research	 papers,	 energy	 industry	 reports,	 policy	 documents,	 articles	 on	
India’s	energy	future	and	the	future	prospects	of	RE,	news	articles,	and	opinion	pieces.	This	
covers	a	range	of	recent	publications	(since	the	change	of	government	in	2014)	published	by	




advisory	 bodies,	 research	 institutes,	 non-governmental	 organisations	 (NGOs),	 think	 tanks,	
and	private	companies	working	in	the	power	sector.	Although	the	relatively	small	number	of	





The	narratives	 identified	here	are	not	meant	 to	be	exhaustive	by	 any	means.	A	 thorough	
analysis	 of	 the	different	positions	of	 all	 the	 actors	 in	 India’s	 energy	debate	 is	 beyond	 the	
scope	 of	 this	 perspective.	 As	 such	 the	 narratives	 identified	 here	 are	 not	 intended	 to	
conclude	a	discussion	on	India’s	energy	further,	but	rather,	spark	one.	Lastly,	as	the	policy	
narratives	 for	 a	 large	 domain	 such	 as	 energy	 futures	 can	 be	 vast	 and	 encompass	 several	
technological	transitions	in	fields	such	as	heating,	cooling,	electricity,	transport	and	more,	in	
this	paper	the	focus	is	on	transitions	in	the	Indian	electricity	sector,	particularly	the	future	
role	 of	 coal	 and	 the	 growth	 of	 renewable	 power.	 The	 electricity	 sector	 is	 set	 for	 strong	
growth	 in	 the	 coming	 decades,	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 ambitious	 government	 targets,	 is	





economic	 growth.	 Assumptions	 over	 strong	 economic	 growth	 have	 historically	 been	 the	
underlying	basis	of	the	Indian	government’s	ambitious	plans	to	increase	electricity	capacity	
[32] and	 the	government	 think	 tank,	 the	National	 Institution	 for	Transforming	 India	 (NITI)
Aayog’s	 Draft	 National	 Energy	 Policy	 (DNEP)	 released	 in	 2016	 also	 estimates	 a	 Gross
















have	 benefited	 from	 coal-based	 power	 for	 200	 years	 and	 have	 spewed	 all	 that	
carbon	up	there	and	now	India	will	pay	three	times	the	cost.”	[35]	
Western	 ‘carbon	 imperialism’	 and	 international	 environmental	 non	 governmental	
organisations	 are	 therefore	 cast	 as	 villains,	 undermining	 the	 government	 agenda	 of	
development.	 Several	 non-governmental	 organisations	 such	 as	 Greenpeace	 have	
experienced	crackdown	in	the	country	[36].	The	hero	of	this	narrative	is	expert	planning	and	
technocratic	 policymaking	 that	 reconciles	 economic	 considerations	 of	 the	 need	 for	
affordable	energy	with	macro	level	energy	questions	over	supply,	demand	and	grid	stability.	
This	narrative	is	also	supported	by	several	actors	 in	the	Indian	private	sector	who	point	to	
the	 ambitious	 RE	 goals	 of	 the	 government	 and	 a	 series	 of	 central	 government	 policy	
initiatives	 such	as	providing	 land	and	other	 infrastructure	 to	power	producing	companies,	
introduction	 of	 generous	 feed	 in	 tariff	 schemes,	 and	 creation	 of	 an	 overall	 investment	
friendly	atmosphere,	as	critical	to	the	rapid	growth	in	RE	in	the	country	(Interview	1,2).	
The	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 economic	 growth	 and	 energy	 security	 however	 means	 that	 no	
technological	option,	particularly	domestic	coal	based	power,	will	be	abandoned.	All	major	
thermal	 power	 companies	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 including	 Adani	 Power,	 Tata	 Power,	 and	
Reliance	 Power	 also	 have	 significant	 investments	 in	 RE	 plants	 themselves	 which	 creates	
limited	 incentive	 for	 the	 large	 thermal	 power	 companies	 to	 pressurise	 government	
intervention	in	the	rapidly	changing	power	markets.	Furthermore,	some	market	actors	feel	
that	 it	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 time	 before	 industrial	 demand	 once	 again	 picks	 up	 and	 long	 term	
economic	growth	rationale	 leads	to	an	 increase	 in	the	use	of	coal	power	[37].	This	view	is	























“Social	 cost	 analysis	 of	 coal	 and	 renewables	 based	 power	 done	 in	 the	 chapter	
indicate	 higher	 social	 costs	 for	 renewables.	 Storage	 costs	 and	 stranding	 of	 assets	





Interestingly,	 despite	 the	 strong	 connection	 of	 RE	 to	 decentralised	 power	 systems	 and	 a	
‘soft’	 energy	 path	 [14],	 with	 the	 narratives	 of	 citizens	 leading	 the	 battle	 for	 energy	
democracy,	such	as	in	the	case	of	Germany	[40],	India’s	large	growth	in	RE	is	envisioned	by	




With	 regards	 to	 solving	 the	 challenge	 of	 energy	 poverty	 and	 access,	 the	 government	
consistently	portray	off	grid	solutions	as	only	‘backup’	or	‘short	term’	measures,	useful	for	
providing	some	level	of	limited	and	expensive	electricity	access	(Interview	9),	but	only	as	a	








“A	 focus	 on	 off	 grid	 solutions	 would	mean	 India	 will	 continue	 to	 remain	 a	 below	
poverty	 line	 society	 for	 a	 long	 time	 without	 development.	 Off	 grid	 solutions	 are	
extremely	expensive	 and	 this	 is	 a	problem	because	when	 the	grid	eventually	does	
get	 extended,	 the	 consumer	 will	 switch	 over	 to	 the	 grid.	 So	 to	 install	 off	 grid	
solutions,	 the	 private	 sector	 needs	 a	 guarantee	 that	 the	 grid	 wont	 be	 extended,	
which	the	government	naturally	cannot	promise	for	political	reasons”	(Interview	6)	
	
Issues	 are	 also	 noted	 with	 the	 management	 and	 maintenance	 of	 off	 grid	 solutions	 with	




by	 decentralized	 solutions	 in	 a	 short	 time’	 [33].	 The	 central	 government	 has	 accordingly	







investments	 in	 transmission	and	additional	 planning	 for	new	 financial	models	 for	 thermal	
power	 plants	 and	 improved	 coordination	 of	 scheduling	 and	 dispatch	 to	 avoid	 excess	
curtailment	[41].	 	Little	attention	is	however	being	paid	to	the	need	for	political	reform	of	






of	 energy	 futures	 that	 places	 energy	 access	 for	 all	 as	 its	 primary	 goal.	 The	 broad	 theme	
running	 through	 the	 story	 is	 egalitarian	 –	 energy	 access	 is	 treated	 very	much	 as	 a	 public	
good	and	the	focus	is	on	ensuring	energy	access	to	stimulate	socio-economic	development	
for	groups	in	the	lowest	income	levels	of	society.	The	narrative	is	this	transformation	should	
be	 led	 by	 bottom	up	 citizen	 initiatives	 for	 decentralised	 and/or	 off	 grid	 energy	 solutions.	
Civil	 society	organisations	as	well	as	some	private	companies	 in	 the	off	grid	energy	sector	
show	support	for	this	storyline.	
	
“More	 than	 250	 companies	 across	 India,	with	 long	 supply	 chains	 and	 networks	 of	




The	 heroes	 of	 India’s	 energy	 future	 in	 this	 narrative	 are	 the	 individual	 and	 local	
communities,	seen	as	taking	an	active	role,	with	the	central	government	required	to	step	in	
to	support	such	initiatives	through	generous	incentives,	subsidies,	and	technological	backing	
for	 community	 led	 initiatives.	 Political	 reform	 of	 the	 power	 sector	 and	 state	 distribution	
companies	 is	 a	 consistent	demand	as	well	 as	 reforms	 in	 the	 cross	 subsidy	model	 so	as	 to	
move	towards	a	system	where	the	rich	pay	to	subsidise	poor	rural	consumers.	The	villain	in	
this	narrative	 is	 the	central	government,	particularly	 the	 lack	of	 systemic	 thinking,	and	an	
undue	 focus	 on	 targets	 for	 political	 expediency	 instead	 of	 frameworks	 is	 blamed	 for	
incoherent	 energy	 policymaking	 [43].	 This	 problem	 is	 compounded	 by	 the	 fact	 that	












In	 this	way,	 environmental	 organisations	 in	 India	 diverge	 from	 their	 foreign	 counterparts,	
expressing	an	explicit	approval	for	government	support	of	coal	power.		




impacts	 in	 India	 is	 justified	 by	 invoking	 the	 principle	 of	 equity	 in	 international	 climate	
politics.	Prominent	environmentalists	continue	to	advocate	the	importance	of	coal	in	India’s	
energy	mix	 and	 support	 the	 government	 narrative	 that	 any	 criticism	 of	 coal	 in	 India	 is	 a	
function	of	western	hypocrisy	[44].			
Off	 grid	 RE	 solutions	 in	 particular	 are	 also	 seen	 as	 critically	 important	 for	 solving	 the	
challenge	 of	 energy	 access	 by	 both	 civil	 society	 actors	 [42,45]	 and	 private	 companies	
operating	in	the	off	grid	energy	sector	[46,47],	who	argue	that	rural	energy	needs	cannot	be	
solved	 through	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 electrical	 grid	 but	 must	 instead	 be	 met	 through	
localised	 solutions,	 for	 which	 markets	 and	 business	 models	 need	 to	 be	 encouraged.	 For	
instance,	Power	for	All,	a	coalition	of	over	200	public	and	private	organisations	working	on	
universal	electricity	access	decry	 the	 Indian	government’s	push	 for	 centralised	grid	access	





infrastructure	 and	 efficiently	 solve	 its	 longstanding	 problem	 of	 300	 million	 un-
electrified	people	at	the	same	time.”	[48]	
Civil	 society	 actors	 across	 the	board	 are	 doubtful	 of	 the	 government	 claim	 that	 India	will	
achieve	government	targets	of	175	GW	of	installed	RE	capacity	by	2022	(Interviews	3,5,7,8).	












challenges	 of	 grid	 integration	 of	 RE	 are	 also	 viewed	 differently	 by	 civil	 society	 actors.	
Overall,	 the	narrative	 that	 integration	of	 high	 shares	of	 RE	on	 the	 grid	 is	 only	 a	 technical	
challenge	is	contested	with	a	focus	instead	on	the	need	for	political	reform	of	the	DISCOMS	




Our	empirical	 analysis	 reveals	 two	compelling	narratives	 in	energy	policy	debates	 in	 India	
that	are	summarised	 in	Table	1:	one	 that	privileges	energy	as	critical	 to	economic	growth	
and	 long	 term	 strategic	 security,	 and	 another	 that	 prioritises	 the	 role	 of	 energy	 for	 basic	
development	and	ending	poverty.	Both	policy	prescriptions	look	to	increase	the	share	of	RE	


















































i.e.	 national	GDP,	 and	 the	government’s	dependence	on	 coal	 is	 largely	 a	 reflection	of	 the
imperative	of	security	of	energy	supply	to	maintain	a	rising	trend	of	electricity	consumption,
seen	as	unavoidable	to	maintain	high	economic	growth	rates	of	greater	than	8%	p.a.	until
2040.	 The	 framing	 of	 energy	 as	 a	 means	 to	 an	 end	 for	 delivering	 economic	 growth	 has
implications	 for	 technological	 choices	 and	 socio-political	 decisions.	 Framings	 of	 a	 policy
issue	 inevitably	 circumscribe	 the	 range	 of	 solutions	 and	 tools	 available	 to	 deal	 with	 the
challenge.	 Rein	 and	 Schon	 for	 instance	 suggest	 that	 frames	 act	 as	 ‘strong	 and	 generic
narratives	that	guide	both	analysis	and	action’	[50].	In	this	case,	high	energy	requirements
and	 rising	 demand	 automatically	 suggest	 that	 growth	 in	 the	 power	 system	 will	 be







technical	 imaginaries’,	 i.e.	 ‘collectively	 imagined	 forms	 of	 social	 life	 and	 social	 order	
reflected	 in	 the	 design	 and	 fulfilment	 of	 nation	 specific	 scientific	 and/or	 technological	
projects’	[51].	Narratives	of	energy	access	for	equitable	sustainable	development	proposed	
by	 civil	 society	 and	 certain	 private	 actors	 clash	 with	 hegemonic	 ideas	 of	 modernisation,	
industrial	 growth	 and	 economic	 prosperity,	 to	 be	 achieved	 through	 universal	 grid	
connectivity	and	a	mammoth	build	up	of	large	scale	energy	infrastructure.		
Genuine	 alternative	 pathways	 emerge	 from	 challenges	 to	 the	 dominant	 discourse	






resources	 and	 technical	 expertise	 as	 well	 as	 broader	 institutional	 power	 in	 terms	 of	
governance	structures	and	closed	off	policy	processes	to	avoid	the	‘agonistic	confrontation	
of	competing	visions	of	a	different	socio-ecological	order’	[53].	Long	term	energy	forecasts	
and	 scenarios	 developed	 by	 powerful	 actors	 can	 serve	 as	 social	 objects	 embedding	 pre-
determined	social	contexts,	legitimising	certain	worldviews	and	casting	some	aspects	of	the	
world	as	fixed	(e.g.	coal	power	in	the	case	of	India)	and	others	as	variable	[54].	Lastly,	civil	
society	 actors	 need	 to	 balance	 the	 twin	 imperatives	 of	 access	 to	 government	 and	
independence	from	government	as	total	independence	is	likely	to	be	incompatible	with	any	
meaningful	 level	 of	 political	 influence	 [55].	 This	 is	 a	 particularly	 challenging	 issue	 in	 India	
given	 the	 closed	 policy	 networks	 that	 erect	 high	 barriers	 to	 new	 entrants,	 surmounting	
which	 might	 require	 relating	 to	 the	 state	 [55]	 and	 risk	 being	 co-opted	 into	 existing	
worldviews,	 institutional	 contexts	 and	 political	 goals	 [56]–	 what	 Dryzek	 has	 termed	 the	
‘state	 imperative’	 [57].	 If	 the	 Indian	government’s	 rhetoric	 is	 taken	as	 face	value	–	 India’s	
economic	and	social	development	and	its	very	programme	of	industrialisation	hinges	on	its	
ability	to	mine	and	burn	coal.	Opposition	to	this	 is	 therefore	seen	as	an	attack	not	 just	on	
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coal,	but	on	India’s	very	right	to	development.	Indian	civil	society	organisations	working	in	
the	 environmental	 space	 have	 therefore	 struggled	 to	 reconcile	 their	 environmental	
protection	 goals	 with	 the	 need	 for	 coal	 in	 the	 agenda	 of	 economic	 development.	 What	






to	the	coal	 industry	may	finally	be	creating	space	 for	policy	 innovation	and	a	challenge	to	
the	central	government	led	narrative.	Just	this	year,	a	divide	opened	up	between	prominent	










broader	 societal	 debates	 around	 the	 future	 of	 national	 energy	 systems	 [8,60,62,63]	 It	 is	





socio-technical	 landscape	 level	 [64]	of	 Indian	energy	policy.	The	benefits	of	 coal	power	 in	
supporting	 the	 development	 agenda	 are	 prominent	 in	 both	 the	 identified	 narratives	 as	 is	
the	 rejection	of	 criticism	of	 coal	use	as	 the	work	of	 foreign	organisations	and	actors.	This	
finding	casts	doubt	on	the	opportunities	for	transformative	climate	policy	in	India	and	as	a	
result	 of	 its	 large	 carbon	 footprint,	 global	 climate	 targets.	 The	 real	 points	 of	 contestation	
instead	lie	in	the	future	pathway	of	technological	deployment	in	the	RE	sector	and	tackling	
energy	 access,	 with	 strong	 preferences	 expressed	 for	 both	 centralised	 and	 decentralised	
energy	 systems.	 Here	 the	 narrative	 most	 closely	 supported	 by	 the	 central	 government	
frames	 energy	 as	 vital	 to	 economic	 growth	 and	 to	 be	 delivered	 through	 expansive	 state	
machinery	 in	 an	 ongoing	 process	 of	 national	 modernisation.	 The	 fundamental	 clash	 this	
vision	 represents	 against	 the	 idea	 of	 distributed,	 small	 scale,	 localised	 energy	 solutions	
suggests	that	private	sector	and	civil	society	efforts	which	target	off	grid	rural	energy	access	
may	struggle	to	attract	any	significant	level	of	government	support.	Furthermore,	research	






Identification	 of	 key	 narratives	 can	 reveal	 pathways	 of	 least	 common	 resistance,	 uncover	
differences	 but	 also	 commonalities,	 as	 well	 as	 highlight	 fixed	 core	 beliefs	 and	 those	
motivations	that	can	be	subject	to	change.	For	the	governance	of	transitions,	it	is	crucial	to	





This	 will	 help	 determine	 the	 power	 of	 the	 narratives	 and	 how	 influential	 they	 can	 be.	
Furthermore,	while	these	narratives	may	hold	true	at	the	national	level,	state	level	politics	
may	 find	 other	 perspectives	 and	 framings	 that	 hold	 particular	 salience	 at	 lower	 levels	 of	
governance.	As	such,	the	divergence	of	state	level	narratives	from	those	at	the	central	level	
may	 reveal	 challenges	 and	 opportunities	 in	 energy	 policy	 implementation	 in	 India,	 as	
electricity	is	a	subject	under	both	central	and	state	government	control.		
Broad	societal	support	will	ultimately	be	a	critical	component	of	 the	shifts	required	 in	 the	
production	 and	 use	 of	 energy	 as	 we	 seek	 to	 meet	 the	 challenges	 of	 energy	 for	 all	 and	
climate	 action.	 Energy	 transitions	 will	 lead	 to	 profound	 social	 impacts	 and	 the	 social	
dimensions	 of	 such	 large	 scale	 changes	 in	 energy	 systems	 need	 greater	 attention	 [11],	
particularly	from	researchers	in	developing	countries.		
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Appendix	
List	of	Interviewees	
Interview	
No:	
Position	 Sector	 Date	
1	 Advisor	to	the	CEO	of	a	leading	renewable	
energy	power	producer		
Private	
Sector	
31-1-2017
2	 Manager,	Investment	Strategy	of	a	leading	
renewable	energy	power	producer	
Private	
Sector	
31-1-2017
3	 Lead	Researcher	on	energy	issues	at	New	Delhi	
based	think	tank		
Civil	Society	 9-2-2017
4	 Lead	Analyst	at	RE	forecasting	and	scheduling	
company	
Private	
Sector	
13-2-2017
5	 Senior	Researcher	on	energy	and	climate	policy	
at	Indian	think	tank		
Civil	Society	 22-2-2017
14
6	 Senior	Analyst	at	renewable	energy	markets	
consulting	company		
Private	
Sector		
01-08-2017	
7	 Senior	staff	member	at	prominent	Indian	
environmental	organisation		
Civil	Society		 08-08-2017	
8	 Programme	Head	at	prominent	Indian	
environment	and	energy	think	tank		
Civil	Society	 21-08-2017	
9	 Head,	Energy	Division	at	Government	policy	
planning	body	
Government	 12-04-2018	
10	 Member,	Planning	Division	at	Government	
advisory	body	for	electricity	policy	
Government		 12-04-2018	
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